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ABSTRACT
Transfer learning facilitates the training of task-specific classi-
fiers using pre-trained models as feature extractors. We present
a family of transferable adversarial attacks against such classi-
fiers, generated without access to the classification head; we
call these headless attacks. We first demonstrate successful
transfer attacks against a victim network using only its feature
extractor. This motivates the introduction of a label-blind ad-
versarial attack. This transfer attack method does not require
any information about the class-label space of the victim. Our
attack lowers the accuracy of a ResNet18 trained on CIFAR10
by over 40%.
Index Terms— Transfer Learning, adversarial, attack, syn-
thetic labels, implicit regularization
1. INTRODUCTION
Neural networks are powerful tools for solving computer vi-
sion problems, but training them from scratch requires huge
amounts of data and compute time [1, 2]. One of the most
popular frameworks for reducing data requirements is transfer
learning [3] in which a pre-trained network (usually trained on
a large labeled dataset like ImageNet) is used to extract low-
dimensional features from images. A new linear classifier head
is then trained to classify images using a small task-specific
dataset and the corresponding number of outputs. Transfer
learning is widely used in practice thanks to the availability
of standard pre-trained models within common deep learning
frameworks like PyTorch and TensorFlow.
In this paper, we study the security vulnerabilities intro-
duced by simple transfer learning strategies. Deep neural
networks are known to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks:
inputs that have been maliciously crafted to fool a victim
network. These attacks generally follow two paradigms: (i)
white-box attacks, in which the attacker has complete knowl-
edge of the victim network (both the network architecture and
weights) and (ii) black-box attacks in which the attacker does
not know the victim network but can query its output label on
chosen inputs [4, 5].
We study a new family of “headless” attacks, in which
the attacker only has knowledge of the feature extractor being
used, but no knowledge of the classifier head and no access to
its output. This is a realistic threat model in situations where
the victim network uses a standard pre-trained model, such as
those that ship with the PyTorch distribution,1 or those avail-
able for download from other popular GitHub repositories.
We find that using a known feature extractor exposes a
victim to powerful attacks that can be executed without knowl-
edge of the classifier head at all. In particular, an attacker can
successfully mount an adversarial attack with no knowledge
of the task-specific dataset used by the victim, the class labels
used by the task-specific head, or even the number of classes
in the victim’s training set.
2. RELATEDWORK
We review related work on transfer learning and adversarial
attacks, highlighting the most closely related attacks to the
threat model we consider.
2.1. Fine-tuning and transfer learning
With the introduction of very large datasets like ImageNet,
and the use of networks with dramatically increased depth,
neural networks have become increasingly successful for many
applications [1, 6]. However, the size of datasets and depth of
networks means that training models to state-of-the-art quality
may be infeasible without immense computational resources.
Since neural networks can learn feature representations of the
input data that are generically useful [7], it is possible to use
them as feature extractors for other tasks [8]. Formally, we
start with a pre-trained feature extractor f with parameters φ
and optimize the head’s parameters, ω, as
min
ω
L(f(x;φ), y;ω),
where L is the standard cross-entropy loss. Note that only the
parameters of the head (ω, often just a linear layer) are trained
in this setup.
2.2. Adversarial attacks
Adversarial attacks on deep neural networks are typically con-
sidered in either the white-box or black-box settings.
1https://pytorch.org/docs/stable/torchvision/
models.html
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
09
00
7v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
0 A
pr
 20
20
In the white-box setting, the attacker is assumed to have
access to the model to be attacked, including arbitrary gra-
dients [5]. An early, simple white-box attack, called Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) makes a bounded `∞ perturba-
tion according to the sign of the gradient of the network’s loss
function with respect to the input [5]. A more powerful attack,
known as projected gradient descent (PGD), iteratively crafts
a perturbation by maximizing the network loss in a bounded
-ball around the input [9, 10]. Other attacks include Deep-
Fool [11], which assumes a linear network to calculate the
perturbation, or the Carlini-Wagner attack [12], which uses
projected gradient descent on an unconstrained loss function.
In the black-box setting, the attacker can only query the
victim and may not know its parameters or even its architec-
ture [4]. One variant of a black-box attack trains a surrogate
network on the same data on which the victim network was
trained, and crafts perturbations on the surrogate network in
the hope that the perturbation will transfer to cause misclas-
sification bt the victim network [13]. Other variants try to
estimate the gradient of the network using softmax outputs
of the network to craft an attack using standard white-box
methods [14, 15]. On the theory side, some work has been
done explaining the transferability of black-box attacks via the
implicit regularization of model complexity [16].
In this paper, we consider a threat model which is different
from both of these models, while combining their properties.
Our threat model assumes that the victim’s feature extractor
is known to the attacker, but the last layer, including the class-
label space, is unknown to the attacker. Unlike both the white-
box and black-box models, we do not assume the attacker
knows which classes or how many classes the victim model
is designed to classify. This is motivated by the widespread
use of transfer learning. For many tasks where labeled data
is sparse, users will take an expressive, pre-trained feature
extractor, e.g., the convolutional layers of ResNet, and fine-
tune a classification head on a new task to quickly deploy a
network on this task [1, 3].
2.3. Other transfer-based attacks
Other works have considered adversarial attacks where the
classification head is not available and the feature extractor
is pre-trained. An attack model with stronger assumptions
was considered in [17], where the attacker is assumed to have
partial knowledge about the labels of some input images and
exploits that knowledge to simply move the input features
close to a target image of a different label. The grey-box
model considered in [18] is closely related to our work, but
was only considered in a very limited setting with two class
labels and no successful attack was demonstrated.
3. HEADLESS ATTACKS
We first test the importance of the classification head in crafting
adversaries with a head-agnostic attack. These experiments
motivate our label-blind attack wherein the attacker has no
knowledge of the victim network’s architecture or parameters.
In this setting, the attacker also has no access to a labeled
training dataset (and therefore does not know the number of
classes and the distribution of labels for the victim’s dataset).
3.1. Centroid-based attack
To test the importance of the classification head, we construct a
transfer attack while denying access to the classification head.
We attack only the feature extractor of a surrogate network
using feature perturbations. We make use of the distances
to the class centroids as synthetic prediction logits, replacing
those that would have been output by the classification head.
Specifically, we consider the following optimization problem
for the perturbation δ:
argmax
||δ||∞≤
L(d(x+ δ),OneHot(y)), (1)
where
(d(x))y = ‖f(x)− µy‖ and µy = 1
N
∑
(x,y′) s.t. y′=y
f(x),
withL denoting the standard cross-entropy loss and f denoting
the feature extractor.
We find that this “headless” centroid-based transfer attack
is competitive with PGD attacks that have access to the sur-
rogate prediction head (see Table 1). This serves as evidence
that having access to just the features, and not the logits of a
network, is sufficient for constructing adversarial attacks.
3.2. Label-blind attack
We now consider the setting where the attacker only knows
the feature extractor that is used, and knows nothing about the
victim’s dataset, including the number of classes and class-
labels. We call this setting the label-blind setting. Given
an image of interest for the victim, the goal is to generate a
perturbation that will cause misclassification by the victim.
We compute the perturbation using the output of a pre-
trained ImageNet classifier as synthetic targets for an ordinary
PGD attack. We do not assume the input was used to train the
ImageNet classifier, or that the image lies within an ImageNet
class. Rather, we rely on the ImageNet classifier being able
to extract discriminative features from the input. We then
find a perturbation that causes these features to shift toward a
centroid further away than the nearest class centroid. We show
that this perturbation transfers to other classifiers that use this
same feature extractor and thus cause these networks to make
errors. Our label-blind attack is detailed in Algorithm 1.
In general, we select a certain logit for each sample accord-
ing to the ranking (i) of that logit among all logits. Then we
optimize the perturbation to minimize the cross entropy loss
on logit i, such that the perturbed image in the feature space
of this extractor lies closer to the manifold of a certain class
different from its ground truth.
Algorithm 1: Headless Horseman Algorithm
Require: Surrogate network S, image x, perturbation δ,
logit ranking index i, number of steps per PGD attack
K, and maximum attack radius .
Initialize δ ∈ B(x) randomly;
for step = 1,...,K do
Calculate cross-entropy loss between the output of
the surrogate network and the one-hot vector
corresponding to the ith highest logit in the
surrogate network’s output on the clean data:
L(S(x+ δ),OneHot(i))
Compute g = sign
(∇δL(S(x+ δ),OneHot(i))).
Update δ = δ − γg.
If ‖δ‖∞ > , then project δ onto the ball B(x).
return perturbed image x+ δ
4. EXPERIMENTS
Our experimental results are evaluated on the CIFAR-10
dataset [19]. The networks trained on CIFAR-10 follow the
default settings (including the mean and standard deviation
for normalizing the images in all our experiments) from a
published repository.2 The pre-trained ImageNet feature
extractors are provided by PyTorch. Our code repository is
publicly available online.3
4.1. Centroid-based attacks
For our centroid-based attacks, we experiment with a variety
of pre-trained networks (trained with different random seeds)
for the victim [20, 21]. We compute the distance between the
target image’s feature representation and the centroids of all
the other classes in feature space. Using these distances as
synthetic logits we minimize the cross-entropy loss for the
ground-truth class. It is critical to observe that the synthetic
logits are large for classes whose feature-space centroid is far
away, and therefore minimizing the cross-entropy loss perturbs
the feature representation in an adversarial direction, which
maximizes the distance to the ground truth class and minimizes
the distance to all other classes. We also project the perturbed
example in input space onto an `∞ -ball. We consider four
choices of .
2https://github.com/kuangliu/pytorch-cifar.git
3https://github.com/zhuchen03/headless-attack.git
 Centroid PGD
1/255 85.13 (.05) 85.75 (.09)
2/255 66.87 (.09) 67.41 (.12)
4/255 37.64 (.20) 35.24 (.38)
8/255 10.57 (.20) 11.01 (.29)
Table 1. Mean and standard deviation of accuracy of classifiers
under Centroid and PGD attacks. All results are based on
20-step attacks with a step size of 0.05 in the normalized
image space. Percentages are averaged over 5 runs. The bold
numbers indicate better results. Both the surrogate and victim
networks are ResNet18 models.

MobileNetv2 [20] SENet18 [21]
Centroid PGD Centroid PGD
1/255 81.08 81.58 85.27 86.03
2/255 70.81 72.56 73.11 74.16
4/255 53.02 55.18 52.60 50.70
8/255 26.35 29.91 23.74 22.39
Table 2. Performance of centroid and PGD attacks transferred
from ResNet18 to other architectures, for single trials.
The results of experiments with centroid-based attacks
are summarized in Table 1. For most of the  values, the
centroid-based attack outperforms the transferred PGD attack
by a small amount; for  = 4/255 we see better performance
from the transferred PGD attack. In all cases, however, perfor-
mance is reasonably close, suggesting that the centroid-based
attack (which requires no knowledge of the classifier head) is
a viable alternative to transferred PGD (which requires such
knowledge). We obtain comparable results transferring from
ResNet18 to other architectures as shown in Table 2.
4.2. Label-blind attacks
To test our algorithm in the label-blind transfer learning set-
ting, we use a ResNet50 pre-trained on ImageNet. We freeze
all the convolutional layers and only train the final fully con-
nected layer. In order to match input dimensions, CIFAR-10
images are up-sampled (we did not use other data augmenta-
tion). This network becomes the victim model. Such a model
achieves 77.90% accuracy on the up-sampled CIFAR-10 test
set. Then, we apply the label-blind attack on the same pre-
trained ResNet18 feature extractor.
Fig. 1 shows the error of the victim model under various
steps of attacks. Under 80-step label-blind PGD attack, the
error of the victim model on CIFAR-10 test set is increased
from 22.10% to 66.19%. In contrast, adding random Gaussian
noise of the same magnitude to the images results in an error of
44.38%. For every number of steps we try, the error after our
attack is higher than random noise plus its standard deviation,
demonstrating the effectiveness of the Headless Horseman
attack.
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Fig. 1. Mean and standard deviation of the error of the
transfer-learned model under different numbers of PGD steps.
We fix the step size of PGD to 0.05 in the normalized image
space, and use  = 8/255. The underlying line shows the mean
and standard deviation of the error under Gaussian random
perturbation with the same magnitude. All results are based
on 4 runs with different random initial perturbations.
Fig. 2 shows the error of the victim model for different
choices of logit rankings i. We find that targeted attacks,
which target more likely classes, transfer more successfully
than when the target classes are chosen as less likely labels.
This suggests that the features that can be most easily per-
turbed to cause misclassification on the surrogate network are
also the features that are most easily perturbed to cause mis-
classification on the victim network, even though the surrogate
network was trained on a different dataset.
5. DISCUSSION
We consider adversarial attacks in the “headless” setting where
the victim is using a public, pre-trained feature extractor,
known to the attacker, but the classification head is not avail-
able. This is a realistic setting – fine-tuning of classifiers on
pre-trained networks is a widespread practice. We consider
two variations of this setting.
In the first setting, the attacker knows the dataset that the
victim is trained on, and aims to perform a transfer attack using
a surrogate model. In this setting, we find that performing a
“headless” centroid-based attack which ignores the classifica-
tion layer performs competitively with a PGD attack, which
requires access to the surrogate’s logits. Success in this setting
motivates our second attack.
In the second setting, the attacker knows nothing about the
dataset of interest to the victim, not even the number of labels,
however, they do know that the victim has used a particular
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Fig. 2. Mean and standard deviation of the error of the
transfer-learned model when choosing logits with different
rankings. All results are with 20-step iterative attacks. Step
size and  are the same as in Fig. 1. The results are based on 4
runs.
pre-trained model. This setting is especially realistic since
many networks use common, pre-trained feature extractors
for previously unlearned tasks. This setting is largely ignored
by standard white-box and black-box adversarial attacks. In
this setting, given a test image, the attacker can craft an adver-
sarial perturbation with the feature extractor and whichever
linear classification head is provided with the network. This
attack transfers to a victim network that uses the same feature
extractor.
6. CONCLUSIONS
One reason for the success of transfer learning is the expressive
feature extractor’s ability to discern discriminative features.
However, this characteristic also makes transfer-learned mod-
els vulnerable to transferable attacks that require no knowledge
of the dataset being used, or of the label space. We hope this
work raises awareness of such security vulnerabilities, and
expect these results to encourage practitioners to avoid the
practice of using publicly-available pre-trained networks for
sensitive applications without adequate precautions.
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